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DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
The Plaintiff-Appellee is Lynda F Jones, a natural 
person. The Defendant-Appellant is Alan D Jones, a 
natural person. The parties are former spouses to each 
other, having been divorced in 1992. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LYNDA F JONES, 
Plaintiff-Appellee 
vs 
ALAN D JONES, 
Defendant-Appellant 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Oral Argument Requested 
Case No. 2004-0192CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is granted pursuant to 
the provision of Section 78-2a-3 (2) (h) , Utah Code 
[appeals from district court involving domestic 
relations]. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal presents the following issues for review: 
1. Whether or not the trial court abused its 
discretion in modifying the alimony award to 
an amount greatly in excess of the payor 
spouse's ability to pay and greatly in excess 
of the needs of the recipient spouse. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in making the modification of the 
alimony award prospectively from the time of 
the order of modification, rather than from 
the time the petition for modification was 
filed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married in 1968. In 1991 the 
Plaintiff filed for divorce, which was granted in 1992. 
At the time of the divorce, the Defendant [Mr Jones] 
was earning in excess of $5,000 per month. The original 
Decree of Divorce provided for an alimony award of $900 
per month, which would increase to $1400 per month when 
the parties' youngest child reached the age of 18 and 
the $500 monthly child support would terminate. 
Pursuant to the original Decree, Mr Jones paid the 
$16,8 00 annualized alimony for about eight years, 
paying Mrs Jones in excess of one hundred thousand 
dollars. 
In 1992 he as a Sales Manager for a regional 
company (Lawson) was earning in excess of fifty 
thousand dollars per year. [His income varied, based 
upon the percentage of commissions "override" earned by 
the numerous salesmen he supervised.] In 2000 Mr Jones' 
employer (Lawson) restructured the compensation 
schedule paid to Mr Jones and other sales managers: his 
compensation dropped from the annual $60,000-range he 
had been earning to $23,000 per year. His duties would 
have remained the same. Rather than accept the 
diminished compensation, he severed his relationship 
with his former employer and sought other employment. 
Mr Jones has been unable to find employment which 
pays him anywhere near his former earnings. Major 
medical problems have restricted, albeit temporarily, 
his employment. Currently he earns about $17,000 per 
year in wages. 
Presently, Mrs Jones having no dependents, in 
acknowledged good health, and capable of supporting 
herself earns $50,000 per year. 
In October 2001 Mr Jones petitioned for a 
modification of the alimony award, based upon his 
diminished ability to pay. 
The District Court ultimately reduced the alimony 
award to $500 per month, which the Appellant [Mr Jones] 
believes is still excessive, given the recipient 
spouse's ability to support herself [on her $50,000+ 
per year annual income] and his extremely diminished 
ability to pay alimony. 
During the modification proceedings the District 
Court entered an order tentatively reducing the 
Defendant's alimony support obligation to $100 per 
month [July 2003; RECORD at page 207; EXHIBIT #1, 
hereto]; however, as the modification proceeded to 
towards finality, the District Court entered a 
"judgment" against the Defendant for approximately 
$30,000 as unpaid arrearages of alimony, thus ignoring 
3 
its previous order and further allowing the Plaintiff-
Appellee a "double recovery", as explained herein. 
This appeal ensued. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO PAY 
$500 PER MONTH ALIMONY, 
SAID AMOUNT GREATLY IN EXCESS 
OF THE RECIPIENTS NEEDS 
AND HER OWN ABILITY TO EARN 
INCOME AND CREATING A "SERIOUSLY INEQUITABLE" RESULT 
In divorce cases, the District Court is granted 
"broad discretion" in making alimony determinations, 
and those determinations will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless the alimony award results from a 
"misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or 
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion." Naranjo vs Naranjo, 751 
P. 2d 1144 at 1146. Emphasis added. See also English vs 
English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah Supreme Court 1977), Eames 
vs Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Appeals 1987) , and Ring vs 
Ring, 29 Utah 2nd 436, 511 P. 2d 155 (Utah Supreme Court 
1973) ["manifest injustice" exception]. 
In the present case the $6,000 per year alimony 
award is a "serious inequity as to manifest a clear 
A 
abuse of discretion." 
Subsection 30-3-5(7) (a) , Utah Code, concerning the 
award of alimony (and, arguably, petitions for 
modification thereof), provides in relevant part: 
The court shall consider at least the 
following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and 
needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipients earning 
capacity or ability to produce 
income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor 
spouse to provide support; 
Concerning these principles the Utah Court of 
Appeals has written: 
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the 
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as 
possible the standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage and to prevent the spouse from 
becoming a public charge." Paffel v. Paffel, 
732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); Jones v. Jones, 
700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) . It should, so 
far as possible, equalize the parties7 
"respective standards of living and maintain 
them at a level as close as possible to the 
standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage." Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 
(Utah 1985); Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 
381 (Utah 1983) . " [T] he ultimate test of the 
propriety of an alimony award is whether, 
given all of these factors, the party 
receiving alimony will be able to support him 
or herself 'as nearly as possible it the 
standard of living . . . enjoyed during 
marriage."' Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 
(Utah 1988) (quoting English, 565 P.2d at 
411) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently 
articulated three factors which must be 
considered in fixing a reasonable alimony 
award: (1) the financial condition and needs 
of the party seeking alimony; (2) that party's 
ability to produce a sufficient income for him 
or herself; and (3) the ability of the other 
party to provide support. English, 565 P.2d 
at 411-12; Davis, 49 P.2d at 649; Lee v. Lee, 
744 P.2d 1378, 382 (Utah Ct .App. 1987) . Failure 
to analyze the parties' circumstances in the 
light of these three factors constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. Paffel, 732 P.2d at 101; 
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075; Boyle v. Boyle, 35 
P.2d 669, 671 (Utah Ct .App. 1987) . As long as 
the "trial court exercises its discretion 
within the bounds and under the standards we 
have set and has supported its decision with 
adequate findings and conclusions, we will not 
disturb its rulings." Davis, 749 P.2d at 649. 
751 P.2d at 1146-1147. Emphasis added. 
Concerning the "ability of the payor spouse", per 
Subsection (iii) of the statute, that is the present 
ability based on what he earns not based on what he 
might have earned in the past. That he, as an older 
worker finding difficulty in obtaining better 
employment, has not been able to find employment 
commensurate with his experience and his abilities, 
does not give him the "ability" when the job and its 
resultant monies simply are not present! 
In the instant situation, Appellant ALAN present 
earns approximately $17,000 per year. On the other 
hand, Appellee LYNDA earns $50,000 per year 
approximately THREE TIMES MORE than ALAN. 
The disparity of earnings and "post-alimony" 
resources is illustrated by the folio-wing chart: 
ANNUALIZED 
"PRE-ALIMONY" EARNINGS 
ALAN 
c. $17,000/year 
LYNDA 
$50/000/year 
ANNUALIZED 
"POST-ALIMONY" RESOURCES 
LEGEND: 
ALAN 
c. $11,000/year 
= $5,000. 
LYNDA 
$56,000/year 
Nevertheless, the District Court ordered ALAN to pay 
alimony at a rate of $500 per month, which equates to 
$6,000 per year. When the $6,000 annual amount is 
deducted from his side of the financial "balance sheet" 
and simultaneously added to her side of the "balance 
sheet", the inequity is even more extreme: 
ALAN LYNDA 
Annualized income $17,000 $50,000 
Alimony award - 6,000 + 6,000 
Net available to party $11,000 $56,000 
LYNDA has $56,000 annualized "income" and ALAN has but 
$11,000: LYNDA has FIVE TIMES MORE "annualized income" 
(including the alimony) than does ALAN.1 
Clearly, the trial court's award of the $500.00 per 
month ($6,000 per year), against his total earnings of 
$17,000 per year, is clearly and "seriously 
inequitable", particularly in context of LYNDA'S 
earnings and her ability to produce income for herself. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CHARACTERIZATION 
OF VOLUNTARY UNDEREMPLOYMENT IS ERRONEOUS, 
IGNORES THE EVIDENCE, AND IS ESSENTIALLY 
A MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW 
Throughout the modification proceedings, on 
xUnder the federal and state tax laws, ALAN is entitled to 
deduct from his "income" the $6,000 paid to LYNDA as alimony, which 
she is required, under the tax laws, to include as her income. The 
tax saving which ALAN receives from the tax "deduction" is minimal, 
in comparison to the amount of remainder monies he's left with. 
o 
numerous occasions, the District Court frequently 
characterized ALAN'S situation as being "voluntary 
underemployment", in that he chose to quit his 
employment. Admittedly, ALAN did choose to terminate 
his employment at Lawson. But such was only AFTER had 
adopted the compensation plan, under which ALAN'S 
compensation was decreased from approximately $70,000 
per year to a mere $23,000 per year. [At the time of 
the compensation decrease, ALAN was facing an alimony 
obligation of $16,800 per year, leaving him but $6,200 
to live on. LYNDA at the time was earning $40,000 per 
year, which later increased to $50,000 per year!] The 
resulting difference in earnings $23,000 had he 
continued to stay with Lawson, vs the $17,000 he 
presently earns is materially insignificant. The 
District Court chose to focus more upon the "voluntary 
termination" (so characterized as "voluntary 
underemployment") and overlooked the actual salary 
issue. Had ALAN stayed with Lawson, at the much 
diminished salary, the Court would likewise be able to 
characterize such as "voluntary underemployment". 
Faced with the "arithmetic" of the situation, it 
was entirely reasonable for ALAN to terminate his 
employment with Lawson, in order to seek a more 
economically-rewarding employment. [Aside from the 
Q 
"arithmetic" issues, most employees faced with a 
situation wherein their wages were "cut" to effectively 
one-third of the former level would not continue to 
do the same job, alimony obligation outstanding or not. 
The District Court was similarly critical, on a 
repeated and continuous basis, about ALAN'S personal 
choice of relocating his residence to Helena, Montana, 
where he had chosen to attempt to start a new economic 
future. The District Court phrased this criticality in 
terms of "you (ALAN) had (alimony) obligations!" or 
words to that effect. Admittedly so, but the existence 
of alimony "obligations" ought not to be deemed to 
constitute the permanent "economic enslavement" 
precluding the free and unfettered exercise of a 
citizen's constitutional right of interstate travel and 
to locate his residence in any state of his choosing. 
Indeed, the District Court's frequent characterization 
and articulation at times in an argumentative tone 
of the "you have obligations" issue exhibited less than 
a detached, impartial, neutral judicial decision: it 
was if the District Court were personally involved in 
ALAN'S actions vis-a-vis the court-ordered alimony 
award! 
i n 
Ill 
THE $500 MONTHLY ALIMONY AWARD 
IS IN EXCESS OF THE RECIPIENT'S NEEDS 
During the modification proceedings LYNDA candidly 
acknowledged she earned $50,000 per year, was in good 
health, and had no dependents to support. In spite of 
her actual earnings (and explicit abilities to earn 
those amounts), she resisted the modification 
proceeding: LYNDA'S position was to the result that 
ALAN should continue to pay the $16,800 per year, in 
perpetuity.2 
When questioned about her "needs" and the effect 
of ALAN'S "reduction" in the alimony he had actually 
paid, in recognition of his own distressed financial 
condition (Lawson employment was terminated) and the 
"petition to modify", her answer was to the effect that 
the reduction required her to forego her "Sunday 
morning golfing game"! 
In similar vein, she testified that when faced with 
the "reduction" in alimony payments to her, she was 
forced to incur "credit card debt" in the amount of 
$30,000 in order to maintain her "lifestyle" (not 
necessarily her terminology) at the time. She 
2LYNDA did concede and the trial court did rule that 
ALAN'S support obligation would terminate, as per the statutory 
amendment adopted in 1995, at the end of 23 years following the 
entry of the Decree (approximately 2015) , when ALAN would be in his 
late-sixties (67) ! 
apparently got her "lifestyle" under control, was able 
to live within her $50,000 per year income, and is 
incurring no new "credit card indebtedness".3 
The $900 "extra" each month LYNDA has available 
should likewise be examined in a long-range context, 
thus: ignoring, for the sake of argument, the economic 
effect of the existing "judgment" (which would fully 
cover the claimed disparity) , in less than three years 
her payments of $900 per month will have fully paid 
back the $30,000 of "credit card indebtedness" she 
incurred. Thus, by the time this "modification" 
proceeding (and this appeal) is terminated, she will be 
the $900 "ahead", each month. She won't then need the 
monies, and ALAN should not be saddled with that 
obligation. 
The "inequity" (see Naranjo, supra) in the alimony 
award in the context both of LYNDA'S earnings and in 
the context of "her needs" is the simple fact that 
3LYNDA testified that she is "paying off" that credit card 
indebtedness not further explained and certainly not documented 
by her during the proceedings at the rate of $900 per month, 
which she included in the listing of her "monthly expenses". Those 
payments, arguably, are nevertheless "covered" by the $30,000+ 
" judgment'" the District Court awarded her for the alimony 
"arrearages" not paid by ALAN following the "modification" 
petition. [As previously noted, the District Court ignored its 
previous ruling that during the pendency of the proceedings the 
alimony would be at the $100 per month amount.] 
The net effect of the "credit card repayment" expense is, 
effectively, that LYNDA has $900 unencumbered income at the end of 
the month: that's $900 "more" than her "needs". 
-i o 
her statement of "expenses" is entirely self-serving. 
What person, given an essentially-unrestricted quantity 
of money, isn't able to spend the entirety of that 
quantity, every month month-after-month. It is almost 
a truism that most persons spend the entirety (or 
almost the entirety) of their incomes, and LYNDA 
seemingly is no exception: whether the $50,000 per 
year, or even $66,800 (approximately) per year, for 
almost two years (during which she accrued the extra 
"credit card debt", which she is not NOW accruing). 
The "bottom line" is, nevertheless, LYNDA earns 
presently $50,000 and ALAN earns $17,000. That is a 
fact which cannot be ignored, the District Court's 
"voluntary underemployment" characterization or not.4 
[See MEMORANDUM DECISION, RECORD at 267 (line 14) . 
EXHIBIT #2, hereto.] Undoubtedly, LYNDA will always be 
able to find the ability to spend whatever is 
available. [Although she claimed that $100 was needed 
4The District Court, in its apparent enthusiasm that its own 
alimony award be fully enforced notwithstanding ALAN's involuntary 
economic downturn (including inability to find employment 
commensurate with his skills and experience), ignored in an 
"abuse of discretion" that evidence. 
Given ALAN'S medical condition life-threatening "bleeding 
esophagus, coma for several days, and doctor's orders to refrain 
from working for a year afterward (which he has disregarded, as he 
had to provide for himself) it is entirely reasonable that he 
might choose to "slow down" and obtain employment which might be 
less stressful, although less economically rewarding. There are 
perhaps other things in life time, relationships, enjoyment of 
environment and leisure which are to some (including ALAN) which 
are more important that the pursuit of "the almighty dollar"! 
i ^ 
per month for "clothing" expense, the District Court 
gratuitously raised that "expense" to $300 per month, 
so as to justify in part a greater alimony amount.] 
It has been frequently observed in judicial 
decisions particularly in the context of the initial 
alimony award that the alimony award might be 
adjusted to "equalize the parties' respective standards 
of living". See Section 30-3-5, Utah Code. Although we 
are here not dealing with an initial award of alimony, 
that principle should nevertheless apply. Conversely, 
the principle (i.e. "equalize the parties' standards of 
living") for which the court arguably has "continuing 
jurisdiction" should certainly not be ignored in 
circumstances where the alimony award (reinforced 
within the "modification" proceeding) is utilized to 
achieve an "inequitable" result in which even a greater 
disparity is inflicted upon ALAN. [To illuminate the 
inherent inequity in the present situation, a 
rhetorical question described in greater detail 
below is posed: perhaps LYNDA, now "riding high" in 
an economic sense, ought to pay ALAN alimony, as she is 
certainly capable of paying something and he's in need, 
if only to "equalize" their lifestyles. Such is 
unlikely to happen, if mainly for the simple reason 
that out of the hundreds if not thousands of reported 
14 
appellate and unreported unappealed divorce cases, 
there has not been a single case in which "alimony" has 
been awarded to the male spouse, notwithstanding the 
"gender-neutral" status5 of the present statute, the 
practice uniformly continues: women are awarded 
alimony, and men aren't! 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ORDER THE DECREASED 
ALIMONY AWARD BACK TO THE DATE OF THE FILING 
OF THE MODIFICATION PETITION AND/OR THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S "INCOME-AVERAGING" 
APPROACH TO THE ALIMONY AWARD IS LIKEWISE 
"INEQUITABLE" AND NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW 
In adjudicating the "modification" petition, the 
District Court required the Petitioner ALAN to provide 
evidence which he did of his "historic" (i.e. "most 
recent five years") earnings (in the form of income tax 
returns). Upon that basis the District Court determined 
the $500 per month ($6,000 per year) alimony award. The 
"income-averaging" approach while perhaps justified 
in situations where the income of a payor-spouse might 
vary significantly from year-to-year (due to bonuses, 
5Such was not always the situation. See Anderson vs Anderson, 
110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132 (Utah Supreme Court 1946) ["Alimony" 
relates to support of the divorced wife] . Alimony is payment by 
former husband (i.e. male) to former (wife) (i.e. female). It was 
only in the 1970s when the Legislature realized that such gender-
based discriminations were constitutionally impermissible that the 
statute was "sterilized". Notwithstanding the current status of the 
statute, the practice i.e. alimony is awarded the wife, but not 
the husband is consistently followed, in the trial courts and in 
the appellate courts. This gender-based discrimination must stop: 
see argument below. 
1 R 
economic factors such, as stock market performance, 
etc.) and thus it would make sense (and be "fair") to 
get an "historical average" upon which to determine 
future alimony at the time of initial divorce is 
"inequitable" and improper, for at least two reasons: 
First, because the practice ignores the 
PRESENT "ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support". See Section 30-3-
5 (7) (a) (iii) , Utah Code. In the instant 
setting, ALAN earns presently what he earns: 
approximately $17,000 per year, if that! He's 
not likely to earn more, as much as he perhaps 
would like to (or had intended to earn, when 
he moved to Montana). The immutable fact is, 
simply, that he earns what he earns and the 
District Court should not be able to ignore 
that fact, the Court's "voluntary 
underemployment" characterizations or 
conclusions to the contrary. 
Secondly, LYNDA, as recipient spouse, has 
ALREADY RECEIVED her allegedly deserved 
"alimony" by reason of those in-the-past 
"historic" earnings; she ought not be enabled 
to receive future alimony on the basis of 
incorrectly assumed "income" (which IN FACT is 
16 
simply not there), which ALAN does not 
presently have, on the basis that he had 
income in those amounts years ago! She's not 
entitled to "double-dip" in this manner. 
In similar vein, the District Court's award of the 
$3 0,000 "judgment" against ALAN (for unpaid alimony 
accruing "post-petition") during the pendency of the 
"modification" proceeding and/or the District Court's 
award of the $500 per month prospectively (from the 
date of actual entry thereof) and no retroactively (to 
the date of filing for the "modification") is 
"inequitable" and imprudent. "Inequitable" because that 
approach (i.e. no retroactivity to filing date) ignores 
the evidence: ALAN didn't have the income then to pay 
the $1600 then any more than he has the income to pay 
the $1600 now. If the reduction is justified which it 
most certainly is now on the basis that he doesn't 
(present and future tense) have the earnings and income 
to pay the $1600, the retroactive reduction is likewise 
justified on the basis that he didn't have the income 
in past (after the filing of the "modification" 
petition)! 
The non-retroactive approach is likewise imprudent 
because it forces the party-litigants and the Courts to 
engage in a "hurry-up" manner of litigating complex and 
1 7 
enduring issues, on the basis of assumed, artificial 
urgency and perhaps without full basis to develop the 
necessary facts and/or resources to litigate the case. 
[That ALAN resides out-of-state and/or doesn't have a 
huge war chest to "bankroll" this litigation hasn't 
made the case move any quicker.] Regardless of how 
quickly the case moved or is perceived to should have 
moved, the fact that ALAN was earning what he was 
earning hasn't changed! In fact, that he has continued 
in his diminished earning capacity a fact that LYNDA 
and the District Court would like to conveniently 
ignore for several years should be seen as a benefit 
to the judicial process, rather than as a personally-
inflicted "penalty" upon ALAN. [It is not necessarily 
his fault that he just can't jump into a new position 
wherein he earns the $70,000 he historically earned 
prior to 2000, after decades of working for Lawson and 
working himself into a supervisory position. Regardless 
of his experience and qualifications for such a 
position, a willing employer has to be found to pay him 
that much. And lots of times employers are, for reasons 
justified or not (i.e. were this not the 
Congressionally-perceived practice, we wouldn't have 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and similar 
statutes on-the-books) . ALAN earns what he earns and 
-I O 
the Court and/or LYNDA simply cannot change the fact. 
ALAN'S age is what it is; his health condition is what 
it is. And those facts cannot be changed! 
ALAN'S situation is not merely the result of a 
"temporary" decrease in income; for all intents and 
purposes, his earnings ought to be deemed to be 
permanent. [If those earnings should change 
substantially, LYNDA would arguably have the right to 
petition for a modification upwards.] See, in contrast, 
Cox vs Cox, 877 P.d 1262 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994) 
[historic review of income justified where party 
experiences temporary decrease in income or unusual 
prosperity during one year], and Olson vs Olson, 704 
P. 2d 564 (Utah Supreme Court 1985) [temporary decrease 
in ex-husband's income]. ALAN'S situation is simply NOT 
"temporary"; it is, unfortunately, PERMANENT (or 
seemingly so) , and must be judicially recognized! 
Wishing it otherwise by looking in the past will not 
change the future! 
IV 
THE COURT SHOULD RE-EXAMINE THE ALIMONY AWARD 
IN THIS CASE AND AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 
FOR ALL OTHER CASES 
The instant fact situation (LYNDA earns $50,000 per 
year, ALAN earns but $17,000 and she wants $16,800 or 
at least $6,000 of that $17,000 each year, in 
1 Q 
effective perpetuity, illuminates the inequity of the 
situation, in this specific case and in an across-the-
board setting for all divorcing spouses. 
What is it about "alimony" which is so imbued with 
judicial wisdom and jurisprudential insight, 
particularly in the Twenty-first Century? Why is it 
that some ex-spouses probably about one-half, 
because statistically (but hard statistics are probably 
not available) about one-half of ex-wives "waive" any 
alimony award pay alimony, and others are under no 
similar obligation? Merely at the whim of the recipient 
spouse, even at the nominal amount of "one dollar per 
year" (in order to keep the door open, in case of 
unanticipated claims or needs in the future)? Given the 
fact that the Legislature has adopted the "no fault" 
(i.e. "irreconcilable differences") grounds for 
divorce, is alimony to an ex-wife even defensible as a 
matter of public policy? 
Persons marry for a variety of reasons; those 
reasons include but are not necessarily limited to 
love, romance, economic reasons, companionship, desire 
to have and raise (but sometimes only to have) 
children, and a million other reasons perceived by the 
private citizen-parties to those marriages. The 
resultant marriages are as diverse and unique as are 
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the number of marriages. The Legislature and the Court 
generally except in "domestic violence" and "abuse" 
situations do not care about the quality or tenor of 
those "marriage relationships". But about one-half of 
those marriages will, over time, end in divorce. The 
Legislature has selected the District Courts to 
adjudicate and implement general law to grant divorce 
to the parties. [Numerous other states have non-
judicial and/or non-adversarial proceedings to 
effectuate divorce.] Those divorces result in an 
effective and complete severing of the "marital 
relationship", and the parties are free and able to go 
on their way except in the case of alimony. 
In the alimony context, now arguably with 
"legislative authorization" but enforceable at the whim 
and/or "needs" of the recipient ex-wife, the courts 
feel the power and responsibility to award alimony. Why 
is this so? Why for all the reasons that private 
parties marry is the "duty of economic support" so 
significant that it continues, in some cases (at the 
ex-wife's claim and demand) after the marital 
relationship has long since terminated and the parties 
are judicially sent on their way? Why are the two 
parties essentially absolved of the entirety of their 
"marital" obligations whatever those are, as the 
private spouses decide amongst themselves sans state or 
legal involvement except for the continuing 
obligation to pay alimony? 
Formerly alimony has been judicially justified on 
the basis of assuring that the recipient "ex-wife" (so 
stated) would not "become a public charge" (go on 
welfare) . See Porco vs Porco, 752 P. 2d 365 (Utah Court 
of Appeals 1988); Paffel vs Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 
(Utah 1986); Jones vs Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985); and Rosendahl vs Rosendahl, 876 P.2d 870 (Utah 
Court of Appeals 1994), cert, denied 883 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1994) . Not only is this alleged "not become 
public charge" justification disingenuous (and 
inapplicable) in the instant situation6, but history 
and present "divorce" practice is to the contrary. [For 
example, hypothetically the divorcing "ex--wife" could, 
as many do, "waive" her claim to alimony. No alimony 
would be decreed. The State wouldn't be involved in 
that "waiver" specifically, or in the private "divorce" 
action generally. Thereafter the ex-wife could apply 
"for welfare" and her "alimony" (or non-alimony) status 
would be immaterial. Alimony not being awarded in the 
first instance, the State would be powerless to 
6The Court could take "judicial notice" of the fact that 
LYNDA, earning $50,000 per year, is not entitled to "public 
welfare". 
intervene in the then-closed divorce and force the ex-
husband to make payments, thus relegating him to 
"second class" citizenship by reason of the "public 
charge" responsibilities which the public-at-large has 
chosen to incur. The resultant "private welfare system" 
imposed upon a few cannot be justified and defended. 
In the Twenty-first Century, the economic 
opportunities for women (as "ex-wives" or not) abound. 
Statistically, women constitute presently approximately 
one-half (sometimes more than one-half) of the 
"classes" of medical schools, law schools and other 
post-graduate and professional training. We are no 
longer in the archaic, anachronistic time-frame 
centuries ago, in "merry old England", when concepts of 
"alimony" were first developed, but have subsequently 
been changed (in England) , but were "imported" to 
America with the colonists and have been incorrectly 
applied, basically on the basis "that we've always done 
it this way". Some states notably Texas preclude, 
as a matter of state policy the award of alimony to 
the ex-spouse! 
If the "marriage" were hypothetically strictly 
one of "economic" or "financial" significance, that 
"marriage" might be characterized as a "partnership" 
might like a business. Yet at the break-up of the 
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business and the resultant adversarial (i.e. judicial) 
proceeding if the parties couldn't "agree", would the 
District Court feel empowered to award seemingly 
permanent, on-going economic payments from the one 
party to be paid to the other party? Certainly not! And 
certainly not in recognition of an "fault" on the part 
of one party (business partner) or the other. [The 
Legislature's abandonment of the "fault" adjudication 
of the "grounds" necessary for divorce together with 
the instant parties' utilization of "irreconcilable 
differences" as their "grounds" for divorce, precludes 
LYNDA from asserting anything other than "she and/or 
ALAN just didn't agree" on things any more and she 
wanted a divorce. Regardless of his intentions and/or 
regardless (obviously) of the parties' commitments and 
promises to each other at the inception of marriage, 
most of which were not only vaguely stated, if at all, 
because the parties were "in love with each other" and 
nothing else mattered, including what happened were 
divorce to enter the picture decades down the road to 
the contrary. She's got "grounds", and the marriage 
ends except for her "alimony".7 
7The legislative recognition of "fault" of the parties in the 
marital break-up is unavailing and confusing. First, in light of 
the "irreconcilable differences" grounds allowed by statute and 
relied upon the instant parties. Secondly, due to the inherently 
vague and ambiguous legal standard established for the private 
parties within the privately-decided "marriage" relationship. And 
O/l 
Utah appellate decisions have previously encouraged 
the trial courts to avoid, where possible "long-lasting 
financial entanglements" in effecting property 
settlement awards. See Marchant vs Marchant, 734 P.2d 
199 (Utah Court of Appeals 1987) [extended distribution 
of retirement benefits]. The instant case is exactly 
that situation: LYNDA, earning $50,000 per year and 
clearly able to take care of herself (and responsible 
for no one else), is certainly not IN NEED thereof. 
Particularly in the face of the simple fact that ALAN 
earns so much less! ALAN has as he was then able 
has paid LYNDA almost $140,000 in alimony already. 
The District Court's $500 per month is clearly a 
"serious inequity" (Naranjo, supra) in that context and 
constitutes an "abuse of discretion". The $500 per 
month alimony award must be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
LYNDA earns $50,000 per year. She's in good health 
and has no dependents. Her living expenses, when 
properly understood and characterized, are well within 
thirdly, not only do the parties not know how to ascertain "fault" 
and "who is a fault?" for the divorce which the Legislature has 
said it doesn't matter but it is a ludicrous and incredible 
judicial endeavor to engage in such a "fault" determination, if 
only for the "alimony" issue! Do the courts really "want to go 
there"? When one examines how much judicial time trial court and 
appellate court has been spent on "alimony" resolution and 
imposition, one comes to the conclusion that such has been a very 
"slippery slope" indeed. 
9R 
that income, to allow her to support herself. 
On the other hand, ALAN earns about one-third of 
what LYNDA earns and, but for the gender-based 
discrimination upon which alimony awards have been 
historically approached, should be receiving alimony 
from her, so as to "equalize" his standard of living to 
hers. 
The District Court's award of the $6,000 per year 
alimony award is, in light of the evidence, a "serious 
inequity" (Naranjo, supra) in light of the immutable 
evidence before the Court and constitutes an "abuse of 
discretion" which must be overturned. 
The District Court's refusal to make the "alimony 
modification" retroactive to the date of filing is 
likewise improper and must be overturned. 
If the Court of Appeals can honestly say, in good 
conscience and recognition of the facts, that it is not 
clearly a "serious inequity" to award LINDA 
approximately $56,000 worth of annual "income" (i.e. 
earnings and alimony) , while ALAN has but one-fifth of 
that amount (approximately $11,000: income, less the 
$6,000 in alimony), then the District Court judgment 
should be affirmed. But if personalities, judicial 
and otherwise, aside the unfairness and "serious 
inequity" is apparent within those simple facts, then 
the Court must reverse the District Court and/or enter 
a more realistic alimony award, perhaps as low as $0 
(or the proverbial "dollar a year", until modified by 
future Court order). 
The Court should nevertheless utilize this 
opportunity blatantly illuminating the unfairness and 
illogical extreme to which "alimony" awards are 
pursued as an opportunity to revisit the whole idea 
of alimony in general, regardless of the statutory 
provisions. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of November, 
2004. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
LYNDA F. JONES, 
ORDER IN RE: JUDGEMENT 
CONTEMPT AND OTHER 
MATTERS 
Civil No. 914900581DA 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
Petitioner, 
v. 
ALAN D. JONES, 
Respondent. 
oOo 
The above referenced matter came on regularly scheduled hearing before the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis, District Court Judge, on June 4, 2003, at 9:00 a.m. Petitioner was present and 
represented by her counsel, Amy E. Hayes, of Dart Adamson & Donovan. Respondent was present 
and represented by his counsel, Stephen G. Homer, Esq. The Court having heard and considered the 
evidence adduced in this matter and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Respondent is in arrears regarding his Court ordered alimony payments to 
Petitioner. 
EXHIBIT #1 
2. Respondent has the ability to have made alimony payments to Petitioner. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Respondent is to serve 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. This jail time is stayed 
for 10 days to allow for the Respondent time to purge the jail sentence. Jail time may be purged with 
a $1,000.00 check or money order received by Petitioner's counsel by June 14,2003. A $25,000 00 
warrant for Respondent's arrest will be held until June 16, 2003, to allow Respondent to make this 
payment. If Respondent does not make this initial payment, Petitioner's counsel shall notify the 
Court and the warrant will be issued immediately. 
2. In addition to the payment of $1,000.00, Respondent is to pay $100.00 per month to 
Petitioner. The first $100.00 is due on or before July 31, 2003, thereafter due the last day of each 
month. If at any time the monthly $100.00 payment is not made, the arrest warrant shall issue. 
3. Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce shall be dismissed unless all medical 
records relating to any medical reasons for Respondent not working over the past year are produced. 
If these records have not been produced to Petitioner's counsel by noon, June 11,2003, Respondent's 
Petition to Modify shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Not withstanding the above, Respondent's Petition to Modify shall be heard by this Court 
on August 13, 2003, at 9:00 a.m. At this time, Respondent should be prepared to present to the 
2 
EXHIBIT #1 
Court specific information regarding whether the Respondent chose to leave his previous 
employment or whether he 
11 DATED this / / day
[CT COURT JUDGE ^ ^ > ^ w 
Rule 4-504 Notice ff // - * ,, 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires that anuo1$jbc$ion t&itfe / 
foregoing Order must be submitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days of aftftfc'servica f^ 
£ 
this Order. 
DATED thisc)5 day of June, 2003. 
DART ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
u-^  ES v O AM\\E.*IAYE  
Attorneys for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ Q ^ a y of June, 2003, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be [x] mailed, postage prepaid, [ ] hand-delivered, [ ] sent via facsimile to: 
Stephen G. Homer, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent 
9225 South Redwood Rd., Ste. B 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNDA F. JONES 
Petitioner/ 
vs. 
ALAN D. JONES, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO, 914900581 
This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on Augusc 
14, 2003. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the 
matter under advisement in order to give counsel an opportunity to 
submit post-trial briefs and additional documentation. The 
petitioner filed her Post-Trial Brief on September 30, 2003. The 
respondent did not file a post-trial brief and the time for doing 
so has now expired. 
The Court has now had an opportunity to review the 
respondent's Petition to Modify, seeking to eliminate the 
respondent's alimony obligation, along with the remaining pleadings 
that have been filed and the exhibits that were presented into 
evidence. The Court has also revisited portions of the trial 
testimony and counsel's closing arguments. Finally, the Court has 
reviewed the petitioner's Post-Trial Brief and the case law cited 
EXHIBIT #2 
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therein. Therefore, the Court is now fully advised and rules as 
stated, herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The respondent contends that his Petition, to Modify is 
premised on two changes in circumstance that occurred subsequent to 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce and which were not contemplated 
by either party. Specifically, the respondent points to the 
substantial reduction in his income or earning capacity and to the 
petitioner's increased ability to provide for her own economic 
well-being because of the gradual, but steady increase in her 
income and earning capacity. 
The Court's preliminary indication at the bench trial was that 
there has been a substantial and material change in circumstances 
which requires a modification in the respondent's alimony 
obligation. The Court now clarifies that this change in 
circumstance arises solely because of the petitioner's increased 
ability to meet her own financial needs and not because of the 
respondent's decision to earn less than he is capable of earning, 
particularly given his lengthy experience in the sales industry. 
Specifically, the Court reiterates its prior finding that the 
respondent has voluntarily reduced his earning capacity with no 
basis for doing so. In other words, the Court is persuaded that 
the respondent did not have to leave Lawson Products because of a 
EXHIBIT #2 
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change in the management scheme or because his earning potential 
would have decreased, or for any other viable reason. 
Further, the Court is unpersuaded that the respondent's 
current underemployment is necessitated by any health concerns or 
physical impediments. To the contrary, the respondent's trial 
testimony was that he is currently in good health. In the end, the 
respondent's counsel articulated it best when he said that his 
client left Lawson Products because he simply intended to earn 
less. Counsel went on to question whether there was anything 
morally wrong with such a decision and how long the respondent 
should continue to be "enslaved" by his alimony obligation. The 
Court addressed these issues during the bench trial by emphasizing 
that she is concerned only with the legal issue of whether the 
respondent's voluntary underemployment obviates his alimony 
obligation. The Court concludes that while a person may choose to 
change careers or choose to earn less; this voluntary act does 
not obviate alimony. Therefore, this Court imputes to the 
respondent the full amount of income represented by his earning 
history prior to his voluntary departure from Lawson Products. 
In contrast to the respondent's decision to voluntarily leave 
his job in order to "earn less," the petitioner has steadily 
progressed in her career and now earns approximately double what 
she earned at the time of the Decree of Divorce. Ironically, 
EXHIBIT #2 
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however, it is the fruits of the petitioner's hard work and 
diligence that now provide the sole legal basis for the respondent 
to claim a change in circumstances and seek to modify his alimony 
obligation. 
Having determined that the petitioner's earning capacity has 
dramatically increased, the question becomes to what extent the 
Court should modify the respondent's alimony obligation. Using the 
petitioner's reasonable financial needs as a reference point, the 
Court concludes that the petitioner is entitled to an amount of 
alimony that will address her unmet financial needs. In this 
regard, the Court finds that the petitioner has understated those 
unmet needs to be approximately $3 00 per month. Taking into 
account a reasonable amount of expenses associated with clothing 
and dry-cleaning, the Court concludes that the petitioner's unmet 
needs are closer to $500 per month. Therefore, the Court grants 
the respondent's Petition, finding a change in petitioner's income, 
and orders a modification of respondent's alimony from $1,400 to 
$500 per month. 
Counsel for the petitioner is to prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law consistent with, but not limited to, this 
EXHIBIT #2 
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Memorandum Decision. Each party is to bear their own attorney's 
fees 
^day oi Dated t h i s ida  f October 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
/('•v'/'v/'.' ^ ^ X 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
LYNDA F. JONES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
ORDER AND JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 914900581DA 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
ALAN D. JONES, 
Respondent. 
0Oo 
The Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came on Trial before this Court on 
August 14,2003. The Petitioner was present and represented by her counsel, Amy E. Hayes, of Dart 
Adamson & Donovan. Respondent was present and represented by his counsel, Stephen G. Homer, 
Esq. Based upon the evidence produced at Trial and the record herein and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Petitioner is awarded a judgment in the amount of $29,700.00 against 
Respondent as and for unpaid alimony for the months of November 2001 through August 2003. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §15-1-4, statutory interest shall accure on this 
judgment until paid in full. 
3. All remaining issues pertaining to the Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce have been taken under advisement and shall be addressed in a separate Order and Judgment. 
DATED this JJ±_ day of September, 2003. 
BY THE COURT 
^>r< 
CSLIE A. LEWIS 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Rule 4-504 Notice 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires that ar 
foregoing Order must be submitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days of 3§%£ service^pf 
this Order. 
DATED this day of 2003. 
DART ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
AYES 
for Petitioner 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
...
 0Oo 
LYNDA F. JONES, 
Petitioner, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ALAN D.JONES, : Civil No. 914900581DA 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Respondent. : Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
oOo 
The Respondent's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came on trial before the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Court Judge, on August 14, 2003, at 2:00 p.m. The Petitioner 
was present and represented by her counsel, Amy E. Hayes of Dart, Adamson & Donovan. The 
Respondent was present and represented by his counsel, Stephen G. Homer, Esq. Both Petitioner 
and Respondent testified under oath and the court received documents in evidence offered by both 
Petitioner and Respondent. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the matter under 
advisement in order to give counsel an opportunity to submit Post-Trial Briefs and additional 
documentation as requested by the Court. The Petitioner filed her Post-Trial Brief on September 30, 
EXHIBIT #4 
2003. The Respondent did not file a Post-Trial Brief within the time period allotted by the Court to 
do so. The Court, after considering the evidence and testimony produced at trial, the arguments of 
counsel and the record herein, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This Court finds that the Respondent alleged two changes of circumstance in this 
Petition to Modify which he contends support his claim that Petitioner's alimony award should be 
eliminated, to wit: Respondent's alleged substantial reduction in his income and/or earning capacity 
and the Petitioner's increased ability to provide for her own financial needs. 
2. This Court finds that there has been a substantial and material change of 
circumstances which requires a modification in the Respondent's alimony obligation. This change 
of circumstance, however, arises solely because of the Petitioner's increased ability to meet her own 
financial needs and not because of the Respondent's decision to earn less then he is capable of 
earning, particularly given his lengthy experience in the sales industry. 
3. This Court reiterates its previous finding that the Respondent has voluntarily reduced 
his earning capacity with no basis for doing so. Specifically, the Court is not persuaded that the 
Respondent had to leave his employment with Lawson Products because of a change in management 
scheme or because his earning potential would have decreased, or for any other viable reason. 
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4. This Court finds that the Respondent's current underemployment is not necessitated 
by any health concerns or physical impediments of the Respondent. To the contrary, the Respondent 
testified at trial that he was currently in good health. This Court agrees with the contention of 
Respondent's counsel that the Respondent left Lawson Products simply because he intended to earn 
less money. 
5. This Court finds that while a person is free to change careers or choose to earn less 
money; this voluntary act does not obviate one's alimony obligation. Therefore, this Court will 
impute to the Respondent the full amount of income represented by his earning history prior to his 
voluntary departure from Lawson Products. 
6. In contrast to the Respondent's voluntary choice to leave his previous employment 
to earn less money, the Petitioner has steadily progressed in her career and now earns approximately 
double of what she earned at the time of the Decree of Divorce. This Court further finds it ironic 
that it is the fruits of the Petitioner's hard work and diligence that now provide the sole legal basis 
for the Respondent to claim a change of circumstance and seek to modify his alimony obligation. 
7. This Court finds that, using the Petitioner's reasonable financial needs as a reference 
point, that the Petitioner is entitled to an amount of alimony that will meet her unmet financial needs. 
8. This Court finds that the Petitioner's attested unmet financial need of $300.00 per 
month is understated. By taking into account the reasonable amount of expenses associated with 
3 
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clothing and dry-cleaning, this Court finds that the Petitioner's unmet financial needs are closer to 
$500.00 per month. 
9. This Court finds that having substantiated a change in the Petitioner's income, that 
the Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce should be granted and his alimony awarded 
reduced from $1,400.00 per month to $500.00 per month. 
10. This Court finds that each party should bear his or her own costs and attorney's fees 
incurred in connection with this action. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this action; 
2. Grounds exist for this Court to modify the Decree of Divorce as set forth above; and 
3. An Order Modifying Decree of Divorce should enter consistent with the Findings of 
Fact, above. 
DATED this ^ 'day of January, 2004. 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Third District Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNDA F. JONES. 
Petitioner, 
v. 
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 91490058IDA 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
ALAN D. JONES, 
Respondent. 
0O0 
The Respondent's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came on trial before the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Court Judge, on August 14, 2003, at 2:00 p.m. The Petitioner 
was present and represented by her counsel, Amy E. Hayes of Dart, Adamson & Donovan. The 
Respondent was present and represented by his counsel, Stephen G. Homer, Esq. Both Petitioner 
and Respondent testified under oath and the court received documents in evidence offered by both 
Petitioner and Respondent. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the matter under 
advisement in order to give counsel an opportunity to submit Post-Trial Briefs and additional 
documentation as requested by the Court. The Petitioner filed her Post-Trial Brief on September 30, 
Signed on 1/27/04, Order Modifying Decree of Divorce 
2003. The Respondent did not file a Post-Trial Brief within the time period allotted by the Court to 
do so. The Court, after considering the evidence and testimony produced at trial, the arguments of 
counsel and the record herein, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having made 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Effective September 1, 2003, the Respondent's alimony obligation is modified to 
$500.00 per month, payable to the Petitioner until her re-marriage, co-habitation, either parties' 
death, or the expiration of 21 years from the date of entry of the parties' original Decree of Divorce. 
2. All provisions of the parties' original Decree of Divorce not expressly modified herein 
shall remain in full force and effect. 
3. Each party shall pay his or her own costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection 
with this action. 
DATED this / /day of January, 2004. 
BYT 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Third District Court Judge 
£&.'•£ 
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